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money. The petitioners would therefore be declared to be entitled
to the balance at the savings bank and the cash which was actually
in the house, but not to the amount payable on the two promissory
notes.
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THE LAW AND. THE LAWYERS.
A criminal was hiding from the pursuit of justice. He sent
for a clergyman for spiritual consolation. The clergyman went to
him, performed the duties of his holy office, and gave the man a
promise not to reveal the place of his concealment. For this the
clergyman, who was chaplain to St. Pancras workhouse, was dismissed from his office and deprived of his daily bread.
We have purposely stated the main facts of the case, without
dates or lesser details, that its character may be clearly seen apart
from any prejudice. It has been made the subject of discussion in
the newspapers, some approving the conduct of the clergyman, others
that of the vestry. It raises an important question in the administration of justice, and therefore we bring it under the notice of the
lawyers.
The law is rightly jealous of privileged communications; but it
recognizes some cases in which confidence is essential to justice
itself, as in communications between client and attorney, or to
society itself, as in communications between husband and wife.
With a strange perversity, however, it does not recognize the interest
of religion as of equal importance, and a confidential communication
to a clergyman is not privileged, although the courts will not resort
to the last remedy to enforce obedience or punish arefusal to betray.
It is much to be lamented that the courts will not frankly and
fully recognize as privileged, all communications made to ministers
of religion in the course of the exercise of their office. It would
not impede justice, because the effect of the existing rules is simply
to prevent sinners from making that confession of sin which God
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commands. It is merely an obstacle to the performance of a religious duty. It is a proclamation by the law to the sinner, "Thou
shalt not do what the Bible enjoins thee to do without hazard of
temporal punishment," It puts him to choose between peril to his
soul and peril to his body. It is a premium upon impenitence.
It has been said that in the present instance the clergyman ought
not to have made such a promise ? Why not? The criminal had
sent for him in the confidence that he would not be betrayed, and
he asked only what the other would have granted without asking.
Was it, then the duty of the clergyman not to go at all? For what
have we ministers of the Gospel to do, if not to bring sinners to
repentance? It is for such as the wretched man who asked his aid in
this case that the clergyman's office is most needed. Once let it be
understood that a minister of the Gospel cannot be trusted with a
secret, and half his usefulness is lost. It is for the interest of
religion that such communications should be privileged, and to that
highest interest even the interests of the law should bend. It would
be better that one criminal should escape punishment than that a
hundred criminals should be deterred from seeking religious consolations, or that a sacred duty should be incompatible with personal
safety.
Very cruel has been the treatment of the clergyman to whom we
refer, very hostile to religion the vote that condemned him to penury,
but, unhappily, we must add, in strict compliance with the letter of
a law, which would be far more honored in the breach than in the
observance.-Law Times.

UNANIMITY OF JURIES-LORD CAMPBELL AND AN ENGLISH JURY.

The absurdity of the rule that requires unanimity in a jury in a
civil cause has received a striking illustration. An action against
a railway company claimed damages for an injury done by an accident. The defence was, that the accident was the inevitable consequence of a tempest, and by no fault of the company. Lord
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who tried the case, told the jury that this was a good
defence, if they were satisfied that it was true in fact. The jury
retired, and after a long deliberation returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages one farthing. This was manifestly ridiculous. If
they believed the defendants, they were entitled to a verdict; if
they were disbelieved, the plaintiff was entitled to substantial damages. Clearly the verdict was the result of a compromise. Lord
CAmPBELL, refused to receive it, and the following scene occurred.
After an absence from the court of two hours and ten minutes
the jury returned, and the foreman said their verdict was for the
plaintiff-damages, one farthing.
CAMPBELL,

Lord CAMPBELL.-I really cannot in the discharge of my duty,
gentlemen, receive that verdict. It cannot be right. It is impossible that it can be right. It cannot stand. The Court of Queen's
Bench would set it aside. If you find for the plaintiff you are
bound to give him reasonable damages. If he is not entitled to your
verdict you must say so. I must beg you will return to your
chamber.
Several Jurymen.-There is no chance of our agreeing, my lord.
Lord CAMPBELL.-I really hope, gentlemen, that by consultation
and deliberation you will agree. Trial by jury has flourished in
England to the great benefit of the land in which we live; but it has
been so by reason of jurymen deliberately and calmly consulting
each other, and usually after that deliberation coming to conclusion
either on one side or the other. Now, in this case it is quite clear
that you have not done so. I must respectfully tell you that you
have not done what the law requires you to do, and I must beg you
to withdraw and deliberate. I cannot receive such a verdict. I should
be guilty of a dereliction of duty were I to receive a verdict which
is unquestionably wrong. You cannot agree in a verdict which is
wrong; but, by consultation, some of you may change the opinion
which you originally had, and unless you deliberate and try to come
to a just opinion, in which you all concur, it is not possible that the
law can be administered. I must request you to withdraw.
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The jury then retired a second time.
At half-past five o'clock, after the lapse of a further interval of
two hours.
Lord CAMPBELL ordered the jury to be brought into court, and
asked them whether they had agreed upon their verdict.
The Foreman.-There is no chance of our coming to any agreement.
Lord CAMPBELL.-Then I can only order you to return to your
chamber and deliberate upon it. That is what the law requires,
and I must enforce it.
The Foreman.-We have gone over it, my lord, and we cannot
agree.
Lord CAMPBELL.-The law is binding upon me and you. Though
not to force your consciences, you must return and be locked up
until you agree.
A juryman.-We have agreed.
Lord CAMPBELL (warmly).-You have agreed in a verdict contrary to law, to justice and to common sense, and I am astonished
at it. No judge ever sat upon the bench with a greater respect for
juries than I have, and the more that I have assisted in the administration of justice in conjunction with juries, the more I have admired
the admirable tribunal which they form. It does surprise me to
find that gentlemen of your intelligence will now, after being told
that your verdict cannot be received, and is a verdict contrary to
law, justice and common sense, persist in a verdict for the plaintiff,
giving it as your opinion that there was negligence on the part of
the company, whereby he suffered severe injuries, and then cutting
him off with a farthing. That is not creditable. You will return
to your chamber.
A jurymn.-Does your lordship refuse to receive the verdict?
Lord CAMPBELL.-I do refuse to receive it, as the law requires
me. You will return to your chamber.
The jury withdrew, and before leaving the bench Lord Campbell
directed the officer of the court to receive any proper verdict, but
expressed a determination not to discharge them until to morrow
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morning if they persisted in the verdict they had already returned.
Lord CAMPBELL took unnecessary pains to express his admiration
of the jury system; but his eulogium must have been addressed to
the principle, not to the practice, for he has himself proposed to
relieve them from the compulsory unanimity now enforced in civil
cases. If any lingering doubt can rest in any mind as to the propriety of abolishing this relic of barbarism, the above narrated
incident must remove it. To expect agreement among twelve intelligent men on questions of civil rights and wrongs, in which there
are of necessity as many views as minds, and which really admit
of infinite degrees of honest difference, is either the dream of a
visionary or the assertion of ignorance. It had its origin in criminal
trials, where but one question is to be decided-" guilty" or "not
guilty"-with the further rule that, in case of doubt, the accused is
entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and to an acquittal. Here
unanimity is very desirable as a protection to the subject, and it
is very practicable, because but two opinions can exist; and if there
is a serious difference which discussion cannot remove, the solution
is found in the conclusion that, where the judges differ, there must
be a reasonable doubt, and that doubt decides in favor of an acquittal. But, in civil cases, the questions are unlimited in number and
intricacy; and, if the jury are intelligent, may, and often must, produce numerous differences of opinion, that lead either to wrongful
concessions or unjust compromises, or discharge without delivery of
a verdict; in either case, inflicting grievous injury upon one or both
of the suitors.
The now frequent occurrence of juries discharged because they
cannot agree is the consequence of their increasing intelligence, and
the more conscientiously and intelligence, and the more conscientiously and intelligently juries perform their duties, the more often
this result will be seen. There is but one remedy-to abolish the
requirement for unanimity in civil cases, where neither reason nor
experience approves it, but retaining it still in criminal trials, where
the rule is supported both by principle and by practice.
We had written this before the finale, which was equally instrue-
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tive. On the following morning the jury came into court, in a very
woebegone condition. With one exception they had eaten and drunk
nothing for twenty-four hours, and that exception was a case of illness, in which a medical man had been sent for, and advised the
administration of some port wine and sandwiches, which prescription
Lord CAMPBELL entirely approved.
Lord CAMPBELL said that, as the law now stood, the jury might
have refreshment before they retired to consider their verdict. He
recollected that Lord Ellenborough had so decided. But after they
were locked up they could not be so refreshed. His Lordship then
directed the jury to be sent for to see if they were agreed.
On being asked whether they were agreed on their verdict, the
foreman said they were not.
Lord CAMPBELL said that, in so answering that they were not
agreed, the jury had given a sensible and reasonable answer, such
as the law sanctioned and demanded; but with respect to the answer
which they had given yesterday, "a verdict for the plaintiff, with
one farthing damages," that was not a reasonable answer, and the
law would not sanction it. It was quite clear the jury did not all
agree on that verdict, that the plaintiff had suffered only one farthing damages. The plaintiff was a respectable man, had suffered
seriously, and had done nothing to hinder him from recovering the
damages which he had sustained, and to which he was entitled by
law. It was therefore impossible for him to receive that verdict.
But now they stated they were not agreed he had a discretion as to
the time when he should discharge them from giving a verdict. At
the assizes, according to the traditional law, a jury which could not
agree were to be locked up during the assizes, and then carried in a
cart to the borders of the next county, and there shot into a ditch.
But, as the jury had sat up the whole night, and had already been
exposed to great inconvenience, he should now discharge them.
Such was the law at the present time, but his Lordship added that
it was his intention to bring in a bill in the next session of Parliament to alter the law on this subject. He was anxious that the old
maxim, that no one should be found guilty of crime, unless the jury
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were unanimously of opinion that he was guilty, should still be
maintained; but in civil causes his Lordship thought a verdict
might be given either by a majority, or a certain number of the
jurymen. He should submit some such measure to the legislature,
and he thought the change would be an improvement in the administration of the law. As the jury were not agreed, this trial would
go for nothing, and the question would be submitted to another jury,
who, it was to be hoped, would agree upon a verdict which would
be satisfactory.-.London -Examiner.

SLANDER-INTERPRETATION OF SLANG-QUERY, WHETHER "BLACKLEG" IS ENGLISH OR SLANG. Barnett vs. Allen, 3 H. & N., 376.

The above case may be referred to as affording an example of
the difference of opinion, which sometimes strangely occurs in our
courts, upon what seems a very simple matter. The action was
brought for the following words of slander, spoken by defendant :
"I am surprised Mr. Reynolds should allow a blackleg" (meaning
the plaintiff) "in this room," (meaning that the plaintiff obtained
his living by dishonest gambling, and was a professed gamester,
and a fraudulent gamester.) A witness was asked what he underThe question was objected to, but
stood by the term "blackleg."
allowed; and the reply was to the effect that it involved the charge
of cheating in the process of card-playing. Pollock, 0 B., said,
that the meaning of the word was well enough known by the public, and it required no expert to explain it. It signified, said the
learned judge, "a person who gets his living by frequenting racecourses, and places where games of chance are played, getting the
best odds and giving the least he can, but not necessarily cheating.
That is not indictable either by statute or at common law." Watson, B., agreed in the main with the Chief Baron. Martin, B. and
Bramwell, B., however, put the point so clearly and conclusively,
that as room was made for variance in the apprehension of such a
question, it is well to note their remarks thereon. "I regret," said
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the former learned judge, " that any difference should exist in the
court on so trifling a matter. I always understood the rule to be,
that words are actionable, if they impute to the person of whom
they are spoken an indictable offence, either on a particular occasion or habitually. By the Stat. 8 and 9 Vict., c. 109, cheating at
cards is indictable, and the question is, did or did not the defendant
use the word with the intention of conveying to the minds of the
persons present the imputation that the plaintiff had habitually by
fraud and malpractice won money. I should so have understood
them, and that such was the defendant's meaning was proved by the
evidence. The witness who was called said he considered the word
'blackleg' to mean a person who plays at cards and cheats; it was
therefore a question for the jury, whether the defendant meant to
impute to the plaintiff, that he had been guilty of an offence for
which he was liable to be indicted under the statute."
Bramwell, B., agreed in this construction of the term. " A person," said the learned judge, "is responsible for the natural meaning of words uttered by him. If a word is properly an English
word, the judge must interpret it. If it be slang, witnesses may be
called to show in what sense it is understood. I doubt whether the
word ' blackleg' is English, or whether it is slang. If it is English,
then I understand it as my brother Martin does; if it is slang, an
interpretation has been put upon it by the evidence. I do not agree
with the Lord 0. B. in thinking that there was no evidence of its
meaning. If it is English the innuendo was unnecessary-if it is
slang that innuendo was proved; that is, the defendant uttered language charging the plaintiff with being a fraudulent gamester. I
entertained some little doubt whether, to constitute a cause of action,
it was not necessary that the charge should be specific; but, on
referring to Comyn's Digest, action on the case for defamation,
D. 4, 1 find that it is actionable if the defendant charge the plaintiff
'with felony generally, as,' he is a thief.' "

